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Abstrakt
Tato práce se v prvé řadě zaměřuje na návrh a implementaci šifrovacího filtru pro Redirect-
ing Filesystem Framework (dále jen RedirFS) v podobě modulu linuxového jádra. Zpočátku
se věnuje problematice kryptografie a šifrování. Dále rozebírá hlavní části RedirFS a
možnosti jejich rozšíření. Potom co je čtenář seznámen s důležitými pojmy, následuje hlavní
část práce. Nejdříve je nastíněn samotný návrh filtru, zvolené postupy - jejich výhody a
omezení. Poslední kapitola je plně věnována cipherflt: vzorové implementaci šifrovacího
filtru.
Abstract
This thesis focuses on design and implementation of a cryptographic filter for the Redirect-
ing Filesystem Framework (RedirFS for short) in the form of a Linux kernel module. It
starts by giving the reader a general overview of modern cryptography and encryption. Be-
fore diving into the filter specifics, it takes a tour of the most important features of RedirFS.
When done with introductory chapters, it describes the design choices made considering
their benefits and limitations. The final chapter is completely devoted to cipherflt: a proof
of concept implementation of the cryptographic filter.
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Chapter 1
Prologue
Data encryption and cryptography in general play an important role in information se-
curity. In today’s world, where information is a valuable resource that needs protection,
cryptography has become a part of our everyday lives. We come in contact with it unknow-
ingly when using mobile phones, credit cards or the Internet. One of its many uses is the
encryption of disk based files in computer systems.
The main goal of this thesis is to design and implement a Linux kernel module for
transparent encryption on top of existing file systems. This is to be achieved by replacing
operations of the Virtual Filesystem (VFS for short) layer in the Linux kernel using the
Redirecting Filesystem Framework.
Chapter 2 explores modern cryptography with focus on its aspects useful in disk based
file encryption. It gives a general overview of the most popular algorithms in use
today with references to further reading.
Chapter 3 introduces the Redirecting Filesystem Framework and serves as a guide how
to use and extend the current version. It also brings some new ideas for extending
the framework’s functionality.
Chapter 4 evaluates different approaches to file encryption by discussing their advantages
and disadvantages.
Chapter 5 is completely devoted to the implementation of a proof of concept encryption
module based on the design outlined in chapter 4.
The reader is expected to have a general understanding of Linux kernel development and
VFS. These subjects were intentionally omitted as many publications are freely available.
The author recommends the book Understanding the Linux Kernel[1], which covers both
subjects extensively. A detailed overview of VFS operations can be found in F. Hrbata’s
Master thesis[6].
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Chapter 2
Cryptography
Cryptography is the study of information concealment. Together with cryptanalysis, which
is the study on how to compromise cryptographic mechanisms, they form the discipline of
cryptology. Until modern times, it referred almost exclusively to encryption and is still
used as a synonym for it in many contexts. Unless indicated otherwise, information in this
chapter has been compiled from the RSA Laboratories’ CryptoFAQ[8].
This chapter focuses on the main concepts of cryptography and encryption in particular.
2.1 Encryption
Encryption is the cryptographic term for an algorithmic process of data transformation
with the purpose of concealing confidential information from unauthorized parties. The
reverse process is called decryption. However, the term encryption usually refers to both of
them. In cryptography, the untransformed data are called plaintext without any implication
concerning their format, whereas the transformed data are called ciphertext.
2.1.1 Algorithms
Algorithms used for performing encryption and decryption of data are called ciphers. They
make use of a secret key when generating ciphertext. Different keys produce different results
and the original plaintext can only be retrieved with the right key. By the type of key used,
ciphers can be divided into two basic groups:
• symmetric ciphers
• asymmetric ciphers
In symmetric ciphers, the same key is used both for encrypting and decrypting data.
Therefore all authorized parties must share one secret key. Because of this fact, the group
of symmetric ciphers is referred to as shared-key cryptography.
On the contrary, asymmetric ciphers use two separate keys. One of them made public,
which enables anyone to encrypt information and the other private used for decryption.
Hence this group of ciphers is called public-key cryptography.
Common use for public-key cryptography is communication, where senders encrypt con-
fidential messages by the receiver’s public key making it practically impossible for anyone
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else to read as long as the private key remains unexposed, effectively protecting the com-
municating parties from eavesdropping. Prominent examples of public-key ciphers are the
RSA and DSA algorithms.
Shared-key cryptography can also be used for communication, but the sender and re-
ceiver have to agree on the key used without anyone else finding out. Sophisticated key
exchanging mechanisms are often required to keep the key secure. On the other hand,
shared-key ciphers are generally faster than their public-key counterparts making them
better suited for cases where key exchange is not an issue. They can be further divided
into:
• stream ciphers
• block ciphers
Stream ciphers work with continuous streams of data. Individual digits (in practice
bits or bytes) are processed one by one according to the current state. They are designed
for encrypting data of arbitrary length unknown beforehand such as voice transmissions
or media streaming. The main disadvantage of stream ciphers is that their keys (called
keystreams) can never be reused. A new keystream has to be generated for every session.
Block ciphers operate on fixed-length chunks of data called blocks. They transform a
block of plain text using the provided key into a block of ciphertext of the same length.
Because block ciphers are best suited for the purpose of this thesis, the remaining sections
of this chapter will be devoted to them.
2.1.2 Prominent block ciphers
In this section, we’re going to take a look at the basic properties of the most widespread
freely available block ciphers in use today.
Advanced Encryption Standard
AES is an encryption standard adopted by the U.S. Government in 2001 consisting of three
encryption algorithms AES-128, AES-192 and AES-256. They operate on blocks of 128
bits and use keys of 128, 192 or 256 bits respectively.[13] AES-256 is the default encryption
algorithm used by TrueCrypt.[19]
Data Encryption Standard
DES is another encryption standard developed in the 1970s. It’s original form worked with
blocks of 64bits and keys of 56bits. With today’s state of computing, this form is considered
insecure due to its small key size and only the improved variant called Triple DES is used
in practice, being nothing more than a triple application with three different keys of the
original DES algorithm on each block of data.[14]
Blowfish
Blowfish is a public domain block cipher designed in 1993 operating on blocks of 64 bits
wit keys of 32 to 448 bits in steps of 8 bits, default being 128 bits.[2] It offers reliable and
fast encryption with small memory footprint and it is the algorithm of choice in the cryptfs
project.[4]
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Twofish
Twofish is closely related to Blowfish and was designed in 1998 as its successor, but didn’t
achieve the same popularity. It uses blocks of 128 bits and keys of 128, 192 or 256 bits.
Twofish was one of the finalists competing for standardization with AES.[3]
2.1.3 Modes of operation
As stated in section 2.1.1, block ciphers operate on fixed-length blocks of data. Encrypting
blocks with the same content using the same key always produces the same result. This
behavior is undesirable for plaintext comprising several blocks as it reveals patterns in it’s
structure leading to highly increased security risks. This disadvantage of block ciphers is
reduced by a concept called modes of operation.
Modes of operation are a way of chaining the application of block ciphers on an arbitrary
number of blocks by making successive blocks dependent on previously encrypted ones. To
provide some randomization to the process and a further increase in security, a dummy
block called the initialization vector (often reffered to as IV) are used when encrypting the
first real block. Let’s take a look at some of the most common modes of operation.[15]
Electronic Code Book
ECB isn’t a real mode of operation. Plaintext is simply divided into blocks and each of
them is encrypted independently. No initialization vector is used.
Cipher-Block Chaining
CBC was designed to hide patterns in encrypted messages. The bits of each plaintext block
are XORed with the bits of the previous ciphertext block before being encrypted. Plain-
text, whose length is not a multiple of block size, needs to be padded when using this mode.
Cipher Feedback
In CFB mode the previous ciphertext block is encrypted and XORed with the current
plaintext block to produce the current ciphertext block. The main advantage over CBC is
that padding is never required.
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Chapter 3
Redirecting Filesystem Framework
The Redirecting Filesystem Framework (RedirFS for short) is a new layer between file
system drivers and VFS implemented as a Linux kernel module. It enables other modules
to add new useful functionality to existing file systems such as transparent compression,
writing to read-only media, merging contents of several directories into one etc. Modules
using RedirFS are called filters.
Filters are like plug-ins in the RedirFS world. They can be registered and unregistered
on-the-fly. RedirFS allows them to register callbacks for supported VFS operations and use
these callbacks to alter the inner workings of the underlying file system driver.
The first version RedirFS was written by František Hrbata in 2005 as part of his master’s
thesis at FIT BUT. Its development still continues with the support of AVG Technologies
(renamed from Grisoft s.r.o. in 2009).[16]
This chapter is conceived as a guide on how to use and extend the current version of
RedirFS. It doesn’t explain RedirFS internals – how it works or why. For this kind of
information, consult F. Hrbata’s Master thesis[6]. Although much has changed since it was
written, the described concepts are still valid today.
3.1 Filter developement
Before we can jump into filter development, a few prerequisites have to be met. As men-
tioned at the beginning of this chapter, RedirFS and its filters are kernel modules. They
are written in C and need to be compiled against the target kernel. RedirFS needs to be
build prior to filters and we can’t do this without its source code, which is freely available
from http://www.redirfs.org along with detailed instructions.[18] After we’ve success-
fully compiled RedirFS, we can start writing a filter by creating a new kernel module for it.
For more information regarding modules, refer to The Linux Kernel Module Programming
Guide[12].
The following subsections go through the basics of filter development by exploring the
most important features provided by RedirFS. All described data types and functions are
defined in redirfs.h unless stated otherwise.
3.1.1 Registration
The life cycle of filters start by their registration with RedirFS. The word registration is
usually associated with filling out annoying forms revealing personal information about
7
ourselves. Filters don’t have it any easier, but instead of colorful forms, they need to fill in
a redirfs filter info structure.
struct redirfs_filter_info {
struct module *owner;
const char *name;
int priority;
int active;
struct redirfs_filter_operations *ops;
};
owner
A pointer to the module where the filter is implemented.
In most cases, THIS MODULE macro is used to fill this member.
name
Name of the filter.
priority
Determines the priority of the filter, lower value means higher priority.
active
If non-zero, the filter will be activated upon registration.
ops
Pointer to a structure containing filter operation callbacks described in section 3.1.3.
Registration is then completed by calling redirfs register filter, which returns a han-
dle to a RedirFS filter object. Unregistering filters is matter of passing the returned handle
to redirfs unregister filter.
redirfs_filter redirfs_register_filter(struct redirfs_filter_info *info);
int redirfs_register_filter(redirfs_filter filter);
3.1.2 Path lists
RedirFS wasn’t designed for filters to be active on the whole file system hierarchy. Although
it isn’t impossible, filters are usually supposed to be active for selected portions of the
directory tree only. This is achieved by the introduction of a concept named path lists.
Each filter has a list of included and excluded paths, where a path is nothing more than
a path name such as /home/user. Upon registration, the list is empty – there are no files
under the filter’s influence. When a new path is added, RedirFS attaches a RedirFS root
object to the corresponding dentry. If the path name is to be included and it is a directory,
the filter becomes active for the whole subtree. On the contrary, if the path name is to be
excluded and it is a directory, the filter becomes inactive for the whole subtree. When a
file is accessed, the closest (going from child to parent) RedirFS root object is evaluated to
determine what filters are active for it.
Before adding a new path to the filter’s path list, a redirfs path info structure has
to be filled in.
struct redirfs_path_info {
struct dentry *dentry;
struct vfsmount *mnt;
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int flags;
};
dentry
Dentry object, that represents the path name we want to add.
mnt
File system mount point.
flags
Either REDIRFS PATH INCLUDE or REDIRFS PATH EXCLUDE.
In most cases, we want to add a specific path name such as /home/user, but RedirFS
provides no way of doing so. Fortunately, there is a handy function named path lookup
defined in <linux/namei.h>, that retrieves the dentry and mountpoint from path name for
us.
After filling in redirfs path info, a call to redirfs add path closes the deal and if
successful, it returns a handle to a RedirFS path object. Added paths can be removed by
calling redirf rem path.
redirfs_path redirfs_add_path(redirfs_filter filter,
struct redirfs_path_info *info);
int redirfs_rem_path(redirfs_filter filter, redirfs_path path);
3.1.3 Filter operations
RedirFS provides a way for filters to react to external events triggering operations on them.
A typical example of such an event is the inclusion of a new path to the filter’s path list.
Each filter can define a set of callbacks upon registration by filling in the ops member of
redirfs filter info described in the previous section. These callbacks are invoked by
RedirFS before triggering the corresponding operation.
The redirfs filter operation structure is defined as:
struct redirfs_filter_operations {
int (*activate)(void);
int (*deactivate)(void);
int (*add_path)(struct redirfs_path_info *);
int (*rem_path)(redirfs_path);
int (*unregister)(void);
int (*rem_paths)(void);
void (*move_begin)(void);
void (*move_end)(void);
int (*dentry_moved)(redirfs_root, redirfs_root, struct dentry *);
int (*inode_moved)(redirfs_root, redirfs_root, struct inode *);
};
activate
Called when the filter is about to be activated.
deactivate
Called when the filter is about to be deactivated.
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add path
Called when a path is about to be added in the filter’s path list.
The redirfs path info structure is described in section 3.1.2.
rem path
Called when a path is about to be removed from the filter’s path list.
unregister
Called when the filter is about to be unregistered.
rem paths
Called when all paths are removed from the filter’s path list.
Filters don’t have to define all of these callbacks as long as they set unused ones to
NULL. A callback returning non-zero aborts the corresponding operation.
3.1.4 VFS operations
The core functionality of RedirFS revolves around replacing VFS operations with it’s own
functions and notifying filters when these functions are called. Before invoking the original
operation, RedirFS calls pre-callbacks of all concerned filters in order of their priority. When
the original operation terminates, post-callbacks are called in reverse order. Filters need
to tell RedirFS they want to be notified about VFS operation calls by passing an array of
redirfs op info structures to redirfs set operations.
struct redirfs_op_info {
enum redirfs_op_id op_id;
enum redirfs_rv (*pre_cb)(redirfs_context, struct redirfs_args *);
enum redirfs_rv (*post_cb)(redirfs_context, struct redirfs_args *);
};
op id
Determines the VFS operation and type of file we’re registering the callbacks for.
Accepted values are defined in enum redirfs op id and are named according to
the following pattern:
REDIRFS <file type> <object type> <operation>, where:
<file type> is one of REG, DIR, CHR, BLK, FIFO, LNK, SOCK for regular files, directories,
character devices, block devices, named pipes, symbolic links, sockets respectively.
<object type> is one of FOP, DOP, IOP, AOP for file, dentry, inode, address space
respectively.
<operation> is the operation name in uppercase.
The last structure in the array passed to redirfs set operations is required to be
a sentinel with this field set to REDIRFS OP END.
pre cb
Pointer to the pre-callback.
post cb
Pointer to the post-callback.
int redirfs_set_operations(redirfs_filter filter,
struct redirfs_op_info ops[]);
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The first arguments of callbacks being registered is the VFS operation call context
used by RedirFS data discussed in section 3.1.5. The second argument is a pointer to
redirfs args – a structure containing information about the original operation call.
struct redirfs_args {
union redirfs_op_args args;
union redirfs_op_rv rv;
struct redirfs_op_type type;
};
args
A union of structures storing arguments the original operation was called with.
Pre-callbacks can modify the values stored to alter the original operation’s behavior.
rv
A union of all types VFS operations can possibly return.
It’s value is insignificant in pre-callbacks.
type
Type of callback filled automatically by RedirFS.
This allows a single function to act as both pre and post callback.
Valid values are REDIRFS PRECALL and REDIRFS POSTCALL.
3.1.5 RedirFS data
Filters often need to store run-time critical data related to specific VFS objects they come
in contact with. RedirFS spares them the hardships involved with keeping track of those
objects and facilitates object to data lookup by providing a feature called RedirFS data. It
allows filters to attach any structure to file, dentry or inode VFS object as well as long as
it contains a member of type struct redirfs data. Structures with this property can be
also attached to redirfs root (RedirFS root) and redirfs context (VFS operation call
context; used to pass data from pre to post callbacks) objects.
RedirFS data are managed using the following set of functions:
int redirfs_init_data(struct redirfs_data *data, redirfs_filter filter,
void (*free)(struct redirfs_data *),
void (*detach)(struct redirfs_data *));
struct redirfs_data *redirfs_get_data(struct redirfs_data *data);
void redirfs_put_data(struct redirfs_data *data);
struct redirfs_data *redirfs_attach_data_<object_name>(redirfs_filter filter,
<object_type> <object_name>);
struct redirfs_data *redirfs_get_data_<object_name>)(redirfs_filter filter,
<object_type> <object_name);
struct redirfs_data *redirfs_detach_data_<object_name>(redirfs_filter filter,
<object_type> <object_name>);
Where <object name> can be either file, dentry, inode, context, root and <object type>
struct file *, struct dentry *, struct inode *, redirfs context, redirfs data re-
spectively. The redirfs init data function takes two callbacks (or NULL) as its last ar-
guments, the first of which is called when the the RedirFS data instance is about to be
freed and the second is called when data is being detached from an object. A pointer to
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the structure containing a member of type struct redirfs data is ment to be retrieved
using the container of macro.
3.1.6 sysfs interface
Sysfs is a virtual in-memory file system provided by Linux 2.6. It was designed for kernel
drivers to export information about devices into user space, but it also works the other
way around and allows device configuration. In sysfs, files represent device attributes and
directories represent attribute groups. As a rule attributes are in ASCII format and contain
a single value. While this isn’t strictly enforced, the size of files in sysfs is usually limited
to one page of data. On most Linux distributions, sysfs is mounted at /sys.[10]
RedirFS makes use of sysfs for managing registered filters by exporting a basic set of
attributes used to perform operations described in section 3.1.3. Filters can also export
their own attributes using the following structure and set of functions:
struct redirfs_filter_attribute {
struct attribute attr;
ssize_t (*show)(redirfs_filter filter,
struct redirfs_filter_attribute *attr, char *buf);
ssize_t (*store)(redirfs_filter filter,
struct redirfs_filter_attribute *attr, const char *buf);
};
attr
Kernel structure containing the name of the attribute, its module and access mode.
show
Called when the attribute is read.
store
Called when the attribute is written.
int redirfs_create_attribute(redirfs_filter filter,
struct redirfs_filter_attribute *attr);
int redirfs_remove_attribute(redirfs_filter filter,
struct redirfs_filter_attribute *attr);
3.2 Extending RedirFS
At the time of writing this thesis, RedirFS didn’t support all VFS operations required to
implement a cryptographic filter. This section reflects the author’s own experience from
extending RedirFS to encompass these operations and ends with some ideas for improving
RedirFS in other areas.
3.2.1 New supported operations
Adding a new supported operation requires modification of at least two files. In redirfs.h,
we need to define its unique ID in enum redirfs op id and a structure to store its argu-
ments in redirfs op args. Next, depending on what VFS object the implemented oper-
ation belongs to, we have to create a new function to override the original operation in
rfs file.c, rfs dentry.c or rfs inode.c. This function is required to adhere to a few
rules:
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• argument list and return value must be the same as the original operation’s
• name has to start with “rfs “ prefix followed by the name of the original operation
To be usable by filters, it should invoke the concerned filter’s pre-callbacks using the
internally defined rfs precall flts. If it returns non-zero, the original operation should
be called, but only if it is set (isn’t NULL). In some cases, the underlying file system ex-
pects VFS to call a generic handler when it isn’t set. The only way to know is to in-
vestigate VFS source code and see what it does. Fortunately, the checks can usually be
found in do <operation name> routines, where <operation name> is the name of the re-
placed operation. The next step is to invoke the concerned filter’s post-callbacks using
rfs postcall flts.
int rfs_precall_flts(struct rfs_chain *rchain, struct rfs_context *rcont,
struct redirfs_args *rargs);
void rfs_postcall_flts(struct rfs_chain *rchain, struct rfs_context *rcont,
struct redirfs_args *rargs);
The last step is to replace the original operation. This is done in rfs <object name> set ops,
where <object name> is either file, dentry or inode depending on the type of object the
operation belongs to. A set of macros is defined for this purpose:
RFS_SET_<obect_type>(object, operation_id, original_operation_name);
Where <object type> is one of FOP, DOP, IOP, AOP for file, dentry, inode, address space
respectively.
3.2.2 Future extension ideas
When implementing the proof of concept cryptographic filter cipherflt discussed in chapter
5, this short list has been compiled with ideas for features that could find their way into
future versions of RedirFS.
Access to original VFS operations
Filters don’t have access to original VFS operations as RedirFS uses opaque data types
to hide such information from them. Sometimes a filter needs to invoke a VFS operation
it overrides, but it can’t do so without serious overhead. Currently the only option is to
temporarily disable its own functionality, but it gets rather tricky in a preemptive kernel,
because other processes might invoke the operation at anytime.
Superblock operations
RedirFS and its filters could benefit from the support of other VFS objects aside from
file, dentry, inode and address space. The first candidate would be the superblock object.
Among others, its operations include inode allocation and file system unmounting. Having
access to them would give filters more control over the underlying file system.
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Chapter 4
Cryptographic filter design
At this point, readers are expected to be familiar with all important concepts of encryption
and have a general overview of possibilities provided by RedirFS for developing file system
extensions on Linux.
This chapter focuses on finding solutions to general challenges related to disk based file
encryption from RedirFS filter point of view without going into any implementation details.
It tries to discuss different approaches and the motivation behind every decision made while
considering both its advantages and disadvantages.
4.1 Goals
The first step to any successful design is to make a list of goals we want to achieve with the
final product. Some of the proposed goals might prove to be unrealistic, but they should
serve as a basis for making design decisions where applicable. Goals set for this project are
as follows:
• it should be possible to activate and deactivate the filter at will
• it should be possible to use different encryption for different paths/files
• only files created under the filter’s influence should be encrypted
• affected files should remain encrypted on disk at all times
• encrypting/decrypting shouldn’t occur on every read/write operation respectively
• security is top priority, but keep it fast and simple; performance and memory footprint
is an issue
4.2 Encryption mechanism
The cryptographic filter design revolves around choosing the right encryption mechanism.
Everything else is of secondary concern.
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4.2.1 Keys and re-keying
Managing keys is one of the most important aspects of encryption. Decisions need to be
made on how users are going to enter their keys and where to store them. It is desirable
for keys to be known before any path is included in the filter’s path list. The first solution
that comes to mind is using module parameters, but it has some serious drawbacks. Keys
would have to be entered when loading the module, making automatic loading somewhat
problematic without having the key physically stored on disk. We would also loose the
possibility to have different keys for different paths, but the real show-stopper is that
module parameters are visible to anyone with access to the system. A better approach is to
require the user to enter a key when including a new path to the filter’s path list. We can
attach this key to the corresponding RedirFS root object and retrieve it from there when
a file on the corresponding path list is accessed.
Another issue with keys is the process of changing them called re-keying. Keys are much
like passwords - they need to be changed on a regular basis in case they got compromised. In
contrast to changing passwords, re-keying might be a long and painful task to accomplish,
because all data encrypted with the old key needs to be re-encrypted using the new key.
With disk based encryption, it could mean re-encrypting anywhere from a few kilobytes to
hundreds of gigabytes.
To reduce this amount of data we’re going to introduce the concept of master keys. For
each new file a master key will be automatically generated and the file will be encrypted
using this key. Then we take the user’s key, encrypt the master key with it and store it at
the end of the file just after the encrypted content. When re-keying takes place we only
have to re-encrypt the master password instead of the whole file reducing the amount of
processed data considerably.
4.2.2 Encrypting file content
The most important question that needs to be answered is: When is the encryption/decryp-
tion of file content going to take place? We don’t want it to happen on every read/write
operation, but we also want data to stay encrypted in the backing store at all times. To
achieve both goals, we need to encrypt data just before it is going to be written to disk and
decrypt it just after it was read from disk.
We’re going to use block ciphers, because they are best suited for the purpose of disk
based file encryption as concluded in chapter 2. To provide an acceptable level of con-
fidentiality, a mode of operation needs to be applied, but having every encrypted block
dependent on all previously encrypted blocks comes with a few disadvantages. When ac-
cessing an arbitrary position, all prior blocks need to be decrypted as well – a serious
performance issue. Another drawback is data integrity: A single byte corruption invali-
dates all following data. It is therefore reasonable to split files into parts and applying the
mode of operation only within them. Since files are read/written from/to disk by the means
of the readpage/writepage VFS operation, that always handles whole pages of data at the
time, we’re going to use pages as those parts.
4.2.3 Initialization vectors
There is no need for an initialization vector to be kept secret, but it should never be used
repeatedly with the same key. Doing so would reveal information about common prefixes
shared by two plaintexts or, in the worst case, completely ruin security. Since we’re going
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to apply a mode of operation to every page, we need as many initialization vectors as there
are encrypted pages.
At first glance, the simplest solution is to randomly generate one for every page and
storing it somewhere in the file possibly before the encrypted page, but after closer exam-
ination, it causes more problems than it solves. It makes the file grow in size. For blocks
of size 128 bits and page size 4096 bytes, the ratio is 1:256. Is that a big deal? Readers
will surely make their own opinion. More importantly, it breaks the file structure - shifting
byte indexes between plaintext and ciphertext. Computing this difference might not be
very demanding, but crossing page boundaries is something to be avoided if possible.
After some research, it has been decided to use another approach called ESSIV, which
stands for Encrypted Salt-Sector IV. It derives the initialization vector from the sector
number (inode number and page index in our case) with a key generated by hashing the
key used for page encryption. ESSIV does not specify any particular hash algorithm, but its
digest size must be a valid key size for the cipher used.[5] Not only does it save us the hassle
of storing initializations vectors, but it also protects the encrypted files from watermarking
attacks.
4.2.4 Encrypting file names
Encrypting file names presents us with a specific problem, because the resulting ciphertext
is very likely to be composed of illegal or unprintable characters. Re-encoding file names
after encrypting is therefore necessary to keep them sane. First we need to create a set
of allowed characters. The set proposed by D. Lewine’s POSIX Programmer’s Guide[9]
seems to be a reasonable start. It permits the use of digits, lowercase and uppercase letters
from the modern Latin alphabet, period, underscore and hyphen giving us a total of 65
characters. It also states that hyphen must not be at the beginning of file names. Removing
it from the set seems to be the most convenient option making the number of characters
a power of two requiring only 6 bits. Thanks to this property, we can use a re-encoding
mechanism similar to uuencode[7] in principle. The least common multiple of 6 and 8 being
24, we can translate 3 characters from the encrypted filename into 4 characters from the
allowed set. File name whose length is not divisible by 3 will have to be padded by zeros
before being encrypted. The disadvantage of this approach is that file names will become
at least one third longer.
Because our cryptographic filter isn’t supposed to be active for the whole file system tree,
some users might feel uncomfortable with the mix of plaintext and ciphertext file names.
Therefore it has been decided to make file names encryption an optional low priority feature.
4.2.5 Tagging encrypted files
Every file affected by the filter needs to be tagged. In other words, we need to be able
to recognize encrypted and unencrypted files. Encrypted files also need to have additional
information attached to them, such as: filter version, algorithm used, key size, initialization
vector size, padding, its master key etc.
Traditionally file headers are best suited for this purpose, but using them would shift
byte indexes between plaintext and ciphertext. To overcome this disadvantage we’re going
to use trailers instead. Trailers are the equivalent of headers placed at the end of files after
the last data block. Headers are more common, because placing this kind of information
at the end of file might negatively affect performance on devices with sequential access.
In our case however, it doesn’t make any difference. To eliminate the need to read the
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trailer from disk on every operation performed on a file, we’re only going to read the trailer
once when first accessed and attach its data to the file’s inode, thus significantly increasing
performance.
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Chapter 5
cipherflt
This chapter is completely devoted to exploring the implementation specifics of the proof of
concept cryptographic filter: cipherflt. It doesn’t present itself as a fully stable application
ready for production usage, but rather as a basis for more robust implementations. Its
development has been closely following the design proposed in chapter 4, trying to prove
the outlined procedures to be valid and feasible.
5.1 CryptoAPI
The Linux kernel provides its own cryptographic framework for performing encryption inside
kernel space called CryptoAPI. It includes essentially all of the most popular block ciphers
and is designed to operate on whole pages of data through a facility known as scatterlists.
These properties make it the ideal candidate for our cause.
CryptoAPI was first introduced in kernel version 2.4.12. At the time, it wasn’t part
of the standard distribution, because of U.S. export laws concerning cryptographic soft-
ware and was only available through the international patch patch-int. Since then, the
aforementioned restriction have been lifted.[11]
CryptoAPI by itself doesn’t perform any encryption, but rather serves as common in-
terface for different algorithms (referred to as transforms) implemented as kernel modules.
To make use of it, <linux/crypto.h> and <linux/scatterlist.h> need to be included
in source files.
Probably the biggest disadvantage of CryptoAPI is the lack of documentation. The
closest thing to it is the example testing module located in the Linux kernel source files at
crypto/tcrypt.c. This section tries to make up for it by editing the information extracted
from there into human-readable format.
5.1.1 Using block ciphers
Block ciphers in CryptoAPI are represented by the structure crypto blkcipher, which is
nothing more than a wrapper for the more generic structure crypto tfm. For manipulating
them, the following functions are exported:
struct crypto_blkcipher *crypto_alloc_blkcipher(const char *alg_name,
u32 type, u32 mask);
int crypto_blkcipher_setkey(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm, const u8 *key,
unsigned int keylen);
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void crypto_blkcipher_set_iv(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm, const u8 *src,
unsigned int len);
void crypto_free_blkcipher(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm);
crypto alloc blkcipher takes the name of the requested algorithm including the mode
of operation if any as its first argument. For example, to request the AES cipher in CBC,
the string "cbc(aes)" is used. The meaning of the remaining arguments is unclear, but
their values can be safely set to zero.
5.1.2 Encrypting pages
All data to be encrypted by CryptoAPI needs to be referenced through scatterlists. Scat-
terlists are a special interface in the Linux kernel used to handle physically non-contiguous
parts of memory as if they were a single contiguous block. It was primarily designed with
direct memory access I/O in mind, as it often needs to perform operations on buffers frag-
mented all around physical memory. The term used for such operations is scatter/gather
I/O and that’s where the name scatterlist comes from.[17] These are the basic functions
used to setup scatterlists:
void sg_set_page(struct scatterlist *sg, struct page *page,
unsigned int len, unsigned int offset);
void sg_set_buf(struct scaterlist *sg, const void *buf,
unsigned int buflen);
After getting a page or buffer into the scatterlist, one more step is required before we
can start encrypting. A valid pointer to crypto blkcipher needs to be wrapped into the
following structure:
struct blkcipher_desc {
struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm;
void *info;
u32 flags;
};
tfm
A pointer returned by crypto alloc blkcipher.
info
Used by CryptoAPI internally.
flags
This member is set by the encryption functions described further in this chapter.
If an error occurs, it is filled with one or more of the following bit flags:
CRYPTO TFM RES BAD KEY LEN
CRYPTO TFM RES BAD KEY SCHED
CRYPTO TFM RES BAD BLOCK LEN
CRYPTO TFM RES BAD FLAGS
The encryption/decryption is then performed using these functions:
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int crypto_blkcipher_encrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
struct scatterlist *dst, struct scatterlist *src,
unsigned int nbytes);
int crypto_blkcipher_decrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
struct scatterlist *dst, struct scatterlist *src,
unsigned int nbytes);
Both of them can work in-place by taking a pointer to the same scatterlist in both of
their dst and src arguments.
5.2 Data structures
This section describes data structures specific to cipherflt. All definitions can be found in
cipherflt.h unless stated otherwise.
5.2.1 Trailer
The structure cipherflt trailer is used to store data read from the trailer placed at the
end of encrypted files as proposed in chapter 4.
struct cipherflt_trailer {
u8 version;
u8 algorithm;
u8 key_size;
u8 iv_size;
u8 padding;
u16 block_size;
unsigned char *key;
};
version
cipherflt version.
algorithm
Encryption algorithm used; 0 for AES, 1 for Triple DES, 2 for Blowfish, 3 for Twofish.
key size
Size of the encryption key in bytes.
iv size
Size of the initialization vector in bytes.
padding
Size of padding (required by some modes of operation) in bytes.
block size
Size of blocks encrypted at once using the mode of operation in bytes.
The only supported value is currently 4096.
key
The master key’s material.
If an unsupported value is read from the file into this structure, the trailer is considered
invalid and the file is left unencrypted. The master key’s material after every other value
has been read sucessfully.
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5.2.2 Inode data
The structures cipherflt inode data are attached to encrypted files inodes after first
access to them.
struct cipherflt_inode_data {
struct redirfs_data rfs_data;
struct inode *host;
struct list_head inodes;
atomic_t trailer_written;
struct cipherflt_trailer trailer;
};
rfs data
RedirFS data anchor.
host
Pointer to the inode this structure is attached to.
inodes
List of all struct inode data used to keep track of files under the filters influence.
trailer written
Non-zero if the trailer has already been written to the file.
Used to prevent race conditions and writting the trailer more than once.
trailer
The trailer data read from the file.
5.2.3 Block
The filter was designed to encrypt blocks of page size at once. In practice however, this
isn’t always the case as page sizes vary on different architectures. On most (if not all) of
them, it is a multiple of 4096 bytes. When larger than this, pages are split into parts. Block
structures are used to build a list of these parts to encrypt/decrypt coupled with generated
initialization vectors.
struct cipherflt_block {
struct list_head blocks;
struct page *page;
unsigned char *iv;
unsigned int len;
unsigned int offset;
};
blocks
The list of blocks about to be encrypted/decrypted.
page
The page this block is part of.
iv
The generated initialization vector.
len
Size of the block. This is currently always 4096, except for the last block.
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offset
Offset in the page.
The initialization vector is generated from the page index and it’s inode number when
the block is created.
5.2.4 Context data
struct cipherflt context data is used for VFS operations to carry over the list of blocks
and information about the encryption about the be performed between pre and post call-
backs.
struct cipherflt_context_data {
struct redirfs_data rfs_data;
struct list_head blocks;
struct blkcipher_desc desc;
struct trailer *trailer;
};
rfs data
RedirFS data anchor.
blocks
List of blocks about to be encrypted/decrypted.
desc
The block cipher used.
trailer
Pointer to trailer data read from the file. Used for encryption parameters.
This structure is supposed to be created in pre-callbacks as lists of blocks to be en-
crypted/decrypted. They usually need to be constructed there, but the actual process is
triggered in the post-callback.
5.3 VFS operations
In this section, we’re going to look into the VFS operation callbacks cipherflt registers with
RedirFS. The goal is to explain in detail its procedures, effectively describing the filters
functionality. All of the mentioned functions are defined in rfs.c unless stated otherwise.
5.3.1 open
When a file is opened, ciperflt has to determine if it is encrypted or not. If the file has been
open before and it is encrypted, its inode is going to have the filter’s data attached to it.
Otherwise we’re going to make an attempt at reading the trailer. If successful, we assume
the file is encrypted. By reading the trailer, at least one page must have been read from
disk. The utility function decrypt already read pages builds blocks from all the file’s
pages in the page cache and decrypts them.
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Pre-callback cipherflt pre open
1. Check if the file’s inode has the filter’s data attached to it. If it doesn’t, go to step 3.
2. If the trailer has been written to the file, delete it by altering the inode size as if the
trailer wasn’t there. Return.
3. Allocate new inode data. If the inode size is zero, assume this is a new file. If it isn’t,
go to step 5.
4. Generate a master key for the file. Go to step 7.
5. Check if the file is encrypted by trying to read the trailer. If it isnt’ goto step 8.
6. Delete the trailer by altering the inode size as if it wasn’t there and call
decrypt already read pages.
7. Attach inode data and return.
8. Release the inode data allocated in step 3 and return.
5.3.2 release
The original intent was to write the trailer when the last process using the file closes it.
Unfortunatly, there is no way to tell the number of processes, that have the file open. Be-
cause of this fact, we need to write the trailer everytime the file is released by a processes
in the case it wasn’t written already. To prevent race conditions an atomic check is made.
Post-callback cipherflt post release
1. Check if the file’s inode has the filter’s data attached to it. If it does and the trailer
hasn’t been written to the file yet, do it now.
5.3.3 write
To save space on disk, some operating systems including Linux use a concept called spare
files. They are like any other file, except some of their blocks are empty. Spare files are
created by writing past the file size leaving empty blocks behind. These blocks are ref-
ered to as holes. When a hole is read into a buffer, its corresponding positions are filled
with zeros. While holes might be useful in some cases, they mess up our encryption mecha-
nism. As a solution, we’re going to fill all potential holes with zeros before they are created.
Pre-callback cipherflt pre write
1. Check if the file’s inode has the filter’s data attached to it. If it doesn’t, return.
2. Compare write offset to the file’s size to check if this write operation would create a
hole in the file. If it would, fill the gap between file’s size and offset with zeros first.
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5.3.4 readpages
When pages of an encrypted file are read from disk into memory, we need to decrypt them.
We cannot do this on the basis of a single page, because some file systems do not use
readpage at all. Due to the way readpages works, we need to make a list of pages that are
going to be read before invoking the original operation.
Pre-callback cipherflt pre readpages
1. Check if the file’s inode has the filter’s data attached to it. If it doesn’t, return.
2. Allocate new context data.
3. Go through the LRU list pointed to by the pages argument and build blocks out of
it. We need to do this now, because file system implementations of readpages remove
entries from the list while processing it. Note that at this point, the page structures
in the list are newly allocated and only their index member is valid.
4. Attach context data and return.
Post-callback cipherflt post readpages
1. Retrieve the context data.
2. Decrypt all blocks.
3. Detach context data and return.
5.3.5 writepages
When pages of an encrypted file are written to disk, we need to encrypt them. After they
have been encrypted and written to disk, we need to decrypt them back, so they remain
intelligible in memory. This might seem like waste of CPU cycles, but the only way around
would be to create new pages for encrypted data. Since we can’t use writepage, because
some file systems don’t use it, we would have to duplicate all the pages being written at
once, consuming a considerable amount of memory.
Pre-callback cipherflt pre writepages
1. Check if the file’s inode has the filter’s data attached to it. If it doesn’t, return.
2. Allocate new context data.
3. Retrieve the range of pages designated for writeback from the wbc argument.
4. If trailer has been written to the file, alter its inode size as if the trailer wasn’t there.
5. Lookup all dirty pages of the file in the range and build blocks out of them.
6. If trailer has been written to the file, restore its inode size
7. Encrypt all blocks.
8. Mark all buffer heads of affected pages as dirty, because we want to write them
whole. This is especially necessary on ext3 file system as discussed in section 5.4.
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9. Set sync mode of the wbc argument to WB SYNC ALL to make sure the encrypted pages
will be really written to disk.
10. Attach context data and return.
Post-callback cipherflt post writepages
1. Retrieve the context data.
2. Decrypt all blocks. Before decrypting each of them, check if their page has the
writeback flag set. If it does, wait for it to clear. This prevents overwrites before the
pages are flushed to disk.
3. Detach context data and return.
5.3.6 d iput
When an inode is released, we need to release the data attached to it, if there is any.
Pre-callback cipherflt pre d iput
1. Check if the file’s inode has the filter’s data attached to it. If it doesn’t, return.
2. Detach inode data and return.
5.4 Unsolved issues
This section outlines the most important issues of cipherflt, some of which had no solu-
tion at the time of writing this thesis or an intermediate solution unfit for real life situations.
Synchronization
What is meant by synchronization in this context, is making sure that nobody touches
the pages we are currently processing in readpages/writepages callbacks. This applies to
both read and write operations. Unfortunately, it is very hard to tell who has access to a
specific page at any given moment and the problem can’t be solved by using conventional
synchronization methods such as spinlocks, semaphores or completions. The only reliable
way is to lock the page, but it doesn’t protect it from being read. Even if it did, writepages
always unlocks pages, making space for race conditions before we lock them again.
Journaling file systems
Journaling file systems such as ext3 are problematic when it comes to writing data to disk.
Their writepages operations are called as with any normal file system, but they rarely use
it for data integrity. Instead, they log all changes made to the journal and write them later
using submit bh directly. As a result, we can’t capture and encrypt data before it is written
to disk by overriding VFS operations. A way around this is to force data synchronization
in writepages by dirtying all buffer heads manually, but this results in duplicate writes
and performance loss.
Memory-mapped files
Memory-mapped files are a feature of modern operating systems allowing on disk files to
be mapped to primary memory. The benefits are increased I/O performance as memory
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operations are generally much faster than making a system call. Memory-mapped files
require special treatment beyond readpages/writepages replacement. On Linux, they are
used by the process loader and thus cipherflt isn’t suitable for encrypting executable files.
Direct I/O
Direct I/O mode is activated by using the O DIRECT flag when opening a file with the
open system call. In this mode, data is read/written directly from/to disk on every I/O
operation making our encryption mechanism obsolete. It is currently ignored by cipherflt
and considered as a way to access the raw encrypted data without deactivating the filter.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
The main goal of this thesis was achieved to a certain extent. cipherflt - the Linux kernel
module providing transparent encryption for the ext2 and ext3 file systems was imple-
mented. While it is far from being a production ready solution, it proves the proposed
design to be valid and it is a good start for further development and future projects. A
contribution to RedirFS was made by implementing support for new VFS operations and
describing some of the undocumented features of the current version.
The author values the knowledge and experience gained.
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Appendix A
Contents of enclosed CD
The enclosed CD contains:
cipherflt
Source files of the proof of concept encryption filter for RedirRFS
redirfs
Modified snapshot of RedirFS with new supported VFS operations required by cipherflt
tex
LATEX source files used to compile this document
xzunap00.pdf
This document in Portable Document Format.
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